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Abstract—Location privacy-preserving mechanisms (LPPMs)
have been extensively studied for protecting a user’s location
at each time point or a sequence of locations with different
timestamps (i.e., a trajectory). We argue that existing LPPMs
are not capable of protecting the sensitive information in user’s
spatiotemporal activities, such as “visited hospital in the last
week” or “regularly commuting between Address 1 and Address
2 every morning and afternoon” (it is easy to infer that Addresses
1 and 2 may be home and office). We define such privacy
as Spatiotemporal Event Privacy, which can be formalized as
Boolean expressions between location and time predicates. To
understand how much spatiotemporal event privacy that existing
LPPMs can provide, we first formally define spatiotemporal
event privacy by extending the notion of differential privacy,
and then provide a framework for calculating the spatiotemporal
event privacy loss of a given LPPM under attackers who have
knowledge of user’s mobility pattern. We also show a case
study of utilizing our framework to convert the state-of-the-art
mechanism for location privacy, i.e., Planner Laplace Mechanism
for Geo-indistinguishability, into one protecting spatiotemporal
event privacy. Our experiments on real-life and synthetic data
verified that the proposed method is effective and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued advances and usage of smartphones and
GPS-enabled devices have provided tremendous opportunities
for Location-Based Service (LBS), such as Google Maps,
Facebook Places and Swarm. In the location-based services,
mobile users have to share their locations or trajectories with
the service providers in order to issue snapshot or continuous
queries, for example, “where is the nearest gas station” or
“continuously report the taxis within one mile of my location”.
It has raised privacy concerns as users’ digital trace can be
used to infer sensitive information, such as home and work
place, religious places and sexual inclinations [1] [2] [3].
A large number of studies (see surveys [4] [5] [6] [7])
have explored how to protect user’s location privacy from
different aspects: privacy goals, adversarial models, location
privacy metrics, and Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
(LPPMs). Privacy goals indicate what should be protected
or what are the secrets (e.g., a single location or a trajec-
tory); adversarial models make assumptions about the adver-
saries; location privacy metrics formally define the quantitative
method for the privacy goal (e.g., Geo-indistinguishability [8]
Yang and Yonghui contributed equally to this work.
or δ-location set privacy [9]); LPPMs study how to achieve a
specified privacy metric.
We argue that existing LPPMs may not be able to fully
protect users’ sensitive information in their spatiotemporal
activities because their privacy goal is focused on protection
of either a single location or a trajectory. A user’s location
data can be represented by tuple (we consider the single user
setting in this paper), i.e., <location, time>, which corre-
sponds to information about “where” and “when” in user’s
real-world activities. Hence, the privacy goals in literature
can be categorized into protecting a single position or a
trajectory. Many LPPMs are proposed for these goals based
on different privacy metrics. For example, Gruteser et al. [10]
designed a spatiotemporal cloaking mechanism satisfying k-
anonymity to protect movement trajectories of users; Andre´s
et al. [8] proposed Planar Laplace mechanism [8] achieving
Geo-indistinguishability to protect single locations; Xiao and
Xiong [9] designed Planar Isotropic Mechanism for δ-location
set privacy to protect each location in a trajectory.
However, the privacy goals in the literature of location
privacy only attempt to confuse adversaries about either the
user’s exact location or trajectory, and the two types of privacy
goals cannot cover all cases of complex combination of spatial
and temporal information (as shown in Fig.1), which we
refer to as spatiotemporal events in this paper. Examples of
spatiotemporal event include “visited hospital in the last week”
(i.e., the hospital visit may happen once or multiple times
at any time in last week) and “regularly commuting between
Address 1 and Address 2 every morning and every afternoon”
(these periodic spatiotemporal events may happen every day).
We show six cases of the Boolean expression between
location and time predicates in Fig.1. It turns out that pro-
tecting a single location or a trajectory are only two cases
among possible privacy goals in protecting a user’s spatial
and temporal information. Let ut be a user’s position at time
t, and si ∈ S, i ∈ [1,m] be one of all m locations on the
map. As shown in Fig.1, the element of a user’s secrets in
her spatiotemporal activities can be represented by a predicate
ut = si (the value can be either true or false). Then, a
spatiotemporal event can be defined as a Boolean expression
by combining different predicates over spatial and/or temporal
dimensions (a predicate alone also can be a spatiotemporal
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event). As shown in Fig.1, the events representing a sensitive
location/area and a trajectory, which are the main focuses in
previous studies of location privacy, are only two cases (i.e.,
(b) and (c)) in the six enumerated examples. Even if each
location or a trajectory is protected, it is not clear whether
or not adversary is able to infer the value of a sensitive
spatiotemporal event. Protecting the privacy of spatiotemporal
events has not been studied in literature.
Temporal dimensionSpatial dimension Spatial and Temporal
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(c) (u1 = s1) ^ (u2 = s1)
(d) (u1 = s1) _ (u2 = s1)
(e) ((u1 = s1) _ (u1 = s2))
^((u2 = s1) _ (u2 = s2))
(f) ((u1 = s1) _ (u1 = s2))
_((u2 = s1) _ (u2 = s2))
(a) (u1 = s1) ^ (u1 = s2)
(b) (u1 = s1) _ (u1 = s2)
Fig. 1: Examples of spatiotemporal events. s1 and s2 are two
locations on the map S. u1 and u2 are two variables about
user’s possible locations at time point 1 and time point 2,
respectively. Event (a) is always false since a user cannot be
at two different locations at the same time. Event (b) means
that the secret is a sensitive area including locations {s1, s2}.
Event (c) represents a sensitive trajectory s1 → s1. Event (d)
denotes that the secret is the visit to s1 at time point 1 or 2.
Event (e) depicts the secret as a type of trajectory pattern, i.e.,
the user may stay at two sensitive areas successively. Event
(f) indicates the secret as user’s presence in sensitive area
{s1, s2} at either time point 1 or 2.
Although an LPPM protecting a single location or a trajec-
tory (i.e., Fig.1(b) or Fig.1(c)) ensures user’s location privacy,
it is not clear whether such mechanisms also provide a certain
level of spatiotemporal event privacy (such as Fig.1(e) or
Fig.1(f)). In this paper, we attempt to formalize the new
privacy goal of spatiotemporal event privacy and quantify how
much spatiotemporal event privacy that an existing LPPM can
provide. Towards this goal, in addition to the lack of definition
and privacy metrics for spatiotemporal event, a challenge
is the computational complexity for quantifying the privacy
loss of a given LPPM w.r.t a specified spatiotemporal event.
For example, given a complex spatiotemporal event, i.e., a
Boolean expression, checking its value (true or false) requires
enumeration of all possible values of the predicates in the
Boolean expression, which can be exponential to the number
of predicates.
Contributions. In this paper, we study how to protect spa-
tiotemporal event privacy for the first time. Our contributions
are summarized as follows.
First, we investigate the privacy goal and privacy metric
for spatiotemporal event privacy. We formally define the new
type of privacy goal, i.e., spatiotemporal events, as Boolean
expressions of a set of (location, time) predicates, and pro-
pose a privacy metric for protecting spatiotemporal events by
extending the notion of differential privacy which we call -
spatiotemporal event privacy. We also explore the difference
between the metrics of location privacy and spatiotemporal
event privacy. It turns out that, although the privacy goal of
spatiotemporal event privacy is more general than location
privacy, the privacy metrics can be orthogonal. Hence, it would
be preferable that an LPPM achieving a location privacy
metric such as Geo-indistinguishability can also satisfy -
spatiotemporal event privacy w.r.t. user-specified events. Lo-
cation privacy provides general protection against unknown
risks, while spatiotemporal event privacy guarantees flexible
and customizable protection which may not be provided by
the existing LPPMs.
Second, we develop a method for quantifying how much
-spatiotemporal event privacy a given LPPM can provide. In
this paper, we model an LPPM as an emission matrix that
takes user’s true position as input and outputs a perturbed
location. As we mentioned previously, one of the challenges
in quantifying the probability of a spatiotemporal event is that
the computational complexity may be exponentially increasing
with the number of its predicates. We develop a two-possible-
world method to quantify spatiotemporal event privacy with
linear complexity to the number of predicates.
Third, based on our quantification method, we propose
a framework, i.e, PriSTE (Private Spatio-Temporal Event),
which converts a mechanism for location privacy into one
for spatiotemporal event privacy. We demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our framework using two case studies using Geo-
indistinguishability [8] and δ-location set privacy [9], which
are the state-of-the-art location privacy metrics.
Finally, we implement and evaluate our algorithms on both
synthetic and real-world datasets evaluating its feasibility,
efficiency, and the impact of various parameters.
II. PROBLEM SETTING AND DEFINITIONS
A. Problem Setting
We study how to protect spatiotemporal event in a single
user setting. Consider a user who is sharing her location se-
quence with a location-based service provider. Since a system
with a trusted server is vulnerable to single point of attack, the
user does not want to share her sensitive information with the
server; instead, she uses a local LPPM that guarantees location
privacy at each timestamp. We denote a moving user’s
true locations as {u1, u2, · · · , uT }. The LPPM blurs user’s true
location ut to a perturbed one ot that satisfies a privacy metric
such as geo-indistinguishability [8] or δ-location set privacy
[9]. Hence, the LPPM can be considered as an emission matrix
that takes user’s true location as input and outputs a perturbed
one. The major notations in this paper are summarized in Table
I.
B. Spatiotemporal Events
Spatiotemporal events can represent user’s secrets in their
real-world activities, such as “visited hospital in the last week”
or “commuting between Address 1 and Address 2 every
morning and afternoon”. Let S = {s1, s2, · · · , sm} be the
domain of space, where m is the number of all locations and
2
s a region consists of some states, s ∈ {0, 1}m×1
t one timestamp in {1, 2, · · · , T}
S a set of regions s
T a set of timestamps
ut a user’s true location at time t
ot a user’s perturbed location at time t
EVENT a spatiotemporal event in time {start, · · · , end}
p˜ot a vector of emission probabilities given the observation ot.
p˜Dot a diagonal matrix with the vector p˜ot on the diagonal.
TABLE I: Notations
si is one location (we use state interchangeably) on the map. A
user’s trajectory consists of a set of {u, t} denoting the user’s
location at timestamp t in {1, 2, · · · , T}. Each pair of location
and time can be represented by a predicate. For example, the
pair {u1, s3} can be denoted by a predicate u1 = s3. If the
user is in location s3 at timestamp 1, then the ground truth of
the predicate is true. A spatiotemporal event is defined as a
Boolean expression of the (location, time) predicates using the
AND, OR, NOT operators, denoted by ∧, ∨, ¬ respectively.
Definition II.1 (EVENT). A spatiotemporal event, denoted by
EVENT, is a set of (location, time) predicates, i.e. ut = si,
under the Boolean operations.
Using Boolean logic to define spatiotemporal events enable
users to customize their privacy preference in diverse real-
world activities. Table II shows some representative examples
of EVENT. If a user is in a state si at timestamp t, then ut = si.
If the user is in a region of {si, sj , · · · , sk} at timestamp t,
then (ut = si) ∨ (ut = sj) ∨ · · · ,∨(ut = sk) holds. If the
trajectory of the user is {si, sj , · · · , sk} over timestamps 1 to
T , then (u1 = si)∧ (u2 = sj)∧· · · ,∧(ut = sk) holds. Based
on the Boolean operations, complicated spatiotemporal events
can be defined as follows.
PRESENCE. When the secret is whether or not a user visited
a sensitive area (e.g., medical facilities) in a given time
period, we can use PRESENCE to represent such secret. A
PRESENCE event holds if a user appears in a region during
some time. In the simplest case, the region consists of one
location, and time period consists of one timestamp, then
it becomes one single location shown in Table II. Hence,
PRESENCE is a generalization of secrets about single locations.
To denote a region, which is a set of locations, we use a vector
s ∈ {0, 1}m×1 where the ith element is 1 if the region contains
si. The time period is denoted by T as a set of timestamps.
Definition II.2 (PRESENCE). Given a set of regions S and a
time period T, if a user appears in s at any timestamp t ∈ T,
then it is a presence event, denoted by PRESENCE(S,T).
Example II.1 (PRESENCE). Fig.2 shows a map of S =
{s1, s2, s3}. The shaded region shows a PATTERN event that
the user appears in a region of s1 or s2 during timestamps
3 and 4. The lines indicate possible trajectories. As long as
user’s true trajectory passes through the shaded region, the
ground truth of the event is true. For this event, the region
s = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ denoting the states s1 and s2; the time period
T = {3, 4} denoting timestamp 3 and 4. The PRESENCE event
is expressed as (u3 = s1)∨(u3 = s2)∨(u4 = s1)∨(u4 = s2).
PATTERN. When the secret is whether or not a user visited
s1
s2
s3
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Presence
Fig. 2: PRESENCE: the user appears in regions of {s1, s2} during
timestamps 3 and 4; PATTERN: the trajectories all go through {s1, s2}
at timestamp 2 and {s2, s3} at timestamp 3.
multiple sensitive areas successively (e.g., a love hotel and
then home), we can use PRESENCE to represent such secret.
In a simple case, the regions consist of single locations at a
set of timestamps, then it becomes single trajectory shown in
Table II. Hence, PATTERN is a generalization of secrets about
user’s trajectories. We define PATTERN as follows where the
set of regions [s1, s2, · · · , sn] is denoted by S.
Definition II.3 (PATTERN). Given a sequence of regions S =
{s1, s2, · · · , sn} and a time period T where si ∈ {0, 1}m×1, if
a user appears in {s1, s2, · · · , sn} sequentially during T, then
it is a pattern event, denoted by PATTERN(S,T).
Example II.2 (PATTERN). Fig.2 shows a set of trajectories
with a PATTERN that all trajectories go through {s1, s2} at
timestamp 2 and {s2, s3} at timestamp 3. For this event, the
region at timestamp 2 is s2 = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ denoting s1 and 22; the
region at timestamp 3 is s3 = [0, 1, 1]ᵀ denoting s2 and s3. The
PATTERN event is expressed as ((u2 = s1) ∨ (u2 = s2)) ∧ ((u3 =
s2) ∨ (u3 = s3)).
From the above definitions, we can see that, in terms of
privacy goal, spatiotemporal event privacy is a generalization
of location privacy. In this paper, we focus on the two repre-
sentative events defined above, i.e., PRESENCE and PATTERN,
which are the two most complicated events in examples of
Fig.1. We note that PRESENCE and PATTERN include the cases
when the time T is not consecutive. For simplicity, we assume
that the events are defined in consecutive time and use start
and end to denote the start point and end point of the defined
spatiotemporal event. Users can customize one or multiple
spatiotemporal events to be protected.
Protecting spatiotemporal events requires a local mechanism
that is able to localize the information about spatiotemporal
event. We need a formal privacy metric to preserve user’s plau-
sible deniability about the truth of her specified spatiotemporal
events, so that even when adversaries happen to infer the spec-
ified spatiotemporal event, the user has plausible deniability.
We propose such a privacy metric for spatiotemporal event
privacy in the next section.
C. -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy
Inspired by the definition of differential privacy [11], we
define -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy as follows.
Definition II.4 (-Spatiotemporal Event Privacy). A mech-
anism preserves -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy for a spa-
tiotemporal EVENT if at any timestamp t in {1, 2, · · · , T}
given any observations {o1, o2, · · · , oT },
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , ot|EVENT) ≤ e Pr(o1, o2, · · · , ot|¬EVENT) (1)
3
EVENT Boolean Expression Interpretation
single location ut = si the location at timestamp t is si
PRESENCE at si during T (u1 = si) ∨ (u2 = si) ∨ · · · ∨ (ut = si) appears at location si during time {1, 2, · · · , T}
PRESENCE at s and t (ut = si) ∨ (ut = sj) ∨ · · · ,∨(ut = sk) appears in region s : {si, · · · , sk} at timestamp t
single trajectory (u1 = si) ∧ (u2 = sj) ∧ · · · ,∧(un = sk) a trajectory of locations during a time period
PATTERN of trajectories
((u1 = si) ∨ (u1 = sj) ∨ · · · ,∨(u1 = sk)) ∧ · · ·
∧((un = sl) ∨ (un = sm) ∨ · · · , (un = sn)) a PATTERN of trajectories
TABLE II: EVENTS of Boolean operations on the (location, time) predicates
(a) indistinguishability-based
Location Privacy
(b) indistinguishability-based
Trajectory Privacy
(c) ε-Spatiotemporal Event Privacy
s1
s2 s3
s1 ! s1
s1 ! s2
s1 ! s3
s2 ! s1
s2 ! s2s2 ! s3
s3 ! s1
s3 ! s2
s3 ! s3
s1 ! s1
s1 ! s2
s1 ! s3
s2 ! s2
s2 ! s3
s3 ! s1
s3 ! s2
s2 ! s1
s3 ! s3
Fig. 3: Illustration of indistinguishability-based privacy metrics
for distinct privacy goals when S = {s1, s2, s3} and T = 2.
where EVENT is a logic variable about the defined spa-
tiotemporal event and ¬EVENT denotes the negation of
EVENT. Pr(o1, o2, · · · , ot|EVENT) denotes the probability of the
observations o1, o2, · · · , ot given the value of EVENT.
There are two major benefits of adopting such “DP-like”
privacy metric. First, it provides a well-defined semantics for
spatiotemporal event privacy. Similar to differential privacy
that requires the indistinguishability between any two neigh-
boring databases [11], -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy requires
the indistinguishability regarding whether the EVENT is true or
false given any observations. Another benefit is that, similar to
differential privacy whose privacy guarantee is independent of
the prior probability of a given databases, the privacy provided
by -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy is independent of the prior
probability of the given spatiotemporal event1.
Although the privacy goal of spatiotemporal event privacy
can be considered as a generalization of location privacy, we
note that it may not be true in terms of privacy metrics.
We illustrate the indistinguishability-based privacy metrics for
the three privacy goals in Fig.3, where the lines connecting
two secrets indicate the requirements of indistinguishability
between the corresponding two possible values of the secrets.
As shown in Fig.3 (a), indistinguishability-based loca-
tion privacy metrics (such as geo-indistinguishability [8])
require indistinguishability between each pair of locations.
Indistinguishability-based trajectory privacy metrics [9] [12]
[13] requires indistinguishability between each pair of possible
trajectories as shown in Fig.3 (b). Whereas, -spatiotemporal
event privacy only requires indistinguishability between the
defined event and its negation. For example, if the spa-
tiotemporal event is defined as PATTERN(S,T) where S =
{s1, s2}, s1 = {s1}, s2 = {s1, s2, s3} and T = {1, 2} (i.e.,
a trajectory passes through s1 and {s1, s2, s3}) successively,
then it does not require the indistinguishability between {s2 →
s3} and {s3 → s2} as shown in Fig.3(c). Such privacy
requirement makes sense; for example, s1 can be a “love
1In our approach, we first compute the prior probability of the given event
with a specific initial distribution pi, and then we make sure that the privacy
is guaranteed w.r.t. any pi in Section IV.
hotel”, s2 is “home”, and s3 is “office”. Such spatiotemporal
event privacy may not be protected by LPPMs.
While we can define simple events such as a location or
trajectory, the corresponding -spatiotemporal event privacy
does not imply the indistinguishability-based location privacy
or trajectory privacy. For example, even if a user specifies all
possible trajectories as her requirements for -spatiotemporal
event privacy, it only ensures the indistinguishability between
“one trajectory” and “not this trajectory”, but no guarantee on
the indistinguishability between any two trajectories. Hence,
the privacy guarantee of -spatiotemporal event privacy is
orthogonal to geo-indistinguishability.
Event-level or user-level differential privacy [14] is different
from spatiotemporal event privacy. In such definitions, an event
means user’s information at a single time point (different to the
definition of spatiotemporal event in this paper); hence, event-
level differential privacy preserves the indistinguishability be-
tween any two possible values of a single event. User-level
differential privacy preserves the indistinguishability between
any two possible sequence of events. These privacy metrics
are for time-series data and statistical queries. Despite the
difference of the settings, the indistinguishability considered
in event-level/user-level differential privacy are similar to the
above location privacy and trajectory privacy, which are shown
in Fig.3(a)(b). Whereas the indistinguishability considered in
spatiotemporal event privacy are shown in Fig.3(c).
Location privacy provides general protection against un-
known risks when sharing location with the third parties,
while spatiotemporal event privacy guarantees flexible and
customizable protection which may prevent against profiling
attacks such as inferring user’s trajectory pattern (location
privacy cannot provide such protection). Therefore, it would
be preferable that an LPPM achieving location privacy metrics
such as geo-indistinguishability also satisfies -spatiotemporal
event privacy. We define -spatiotemporal event privacy as
the indistinguishability between an event and its negation
because it provides a clear privacy semantics: the adversaries
cannot infer or distinguish whether the event happened or
not. Alternatively we can define privacy as indistinguishability
between an event and an alternative event. In addition to
requiring users to define the alternative events, it presents ad-
ditional challenges that may involve analyzing the correlations
and exclusivity between events and complicated composition
property of -spatiotemporal event privacy. We defer this to
future work.
4
III. QUANTIFYING -SPATIOTEMPORAL EVENT PRIVACY
A. Overview of our approach
Given the emission matrix of an LPPM that takes input
as user’s true location ut and outputs a perturbed location
ot at time t, quantifying the privacy guarantee under the
metric of -spatiotemporal event privacy is equivalent to
calculating the maximum ratio of Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) given
any o1, o2, · · · , oT . It is hard to derive this ratio directly
from the emission matrix without specifying o1, o2, · · · , oT
and correlations between locations. Firstly, it is because we
are not clear about the relationship between the perturbed
output ot and the defined EVENT. Secondly, the predicates
in the defined EVENT may not be independent. For example,
if EVENT is defined as (u1 = s1) ∧ (u2 = s2), the probability
of such event, i.e., Pr((u1 = s1) ∧ (u2 = s2)), may not be
equal to Pr((u1 = s1)) ∗ Pr((u2 = s2)) because the true
locations in user’s trajectory can be temporally correlated.
For simplicity, we first model the correlation between user’s
consecutive locations using first-order2 time-homogeneous3
Markov model, i.e., the transition matrix is identical at each
t. Then, we quantify this ratio w.r.t. given observations
o1, o2, · · · , oT and a given user’s initial probability pi, so
that we can directly calculate the Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT).
In Section IV, we will design a mechanism for spatiotem-
poral event privacy w.r.t. any observations and arbitrary ini-
tial probability. Our goal in this section is to calculate the
likelihood of the observations given EVENT or ¬EVENT , i.e.,
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT) or Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |¬EVENT), which can
be derived by Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT) = Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)Pr(EVENT) .
We call Pr(EVENT) as prior probability of the event, and
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT , EVENT) as joint probability of the event.
One challenge of calculating the prior or joint probabil-
ities of the event is the computational complexity. Given
an arbitrary spatiotemporal event, we need to enumerate all
possible combination of the Boolean expression for prior and
joint probabilities, which can be exponential to the number
of predicates in the expression. To address this problem, we
propose a two-possible-world method for computing the prior
and joint probabilities in Sections III-B and III-C, respectively.
For ease of exposition, we define notations frequently used
in the following sections. M ∈ Rm×m denotes a transition ma-
trix that describes temporal correlations in user’s location. At
timestamp 1, an initial probability is denoted by pi ∈ [0, 1]1×m.
During timestamp {1, 2, · · · , T}, the probability of the true
location Pr(ut) is denoted by a row vector pt ∈ [0, 1]1×m where
the ith element denotes Pr(ut = si). A Markov model follows
the transition property of pt+1 = ptM, e.g., after a Markov
transition, p2 = piM at timestamp 2 given p1 = pi.
The notations below for matrix computation are also used
in the rest of this paper. Let 0 and 1 be row vectors with m
elements being 0 and 1 respectively. [0, 1] is a row vector in
2If the Markov model is high-ordered, i.e., the transition matrix has a larger
state domain, our approach still works by applying the new matrix.
3If the Markov model is time-varying, i.e., transition matrices at different t
are not identical, our approach still works. We explain this in the next section.
R1×2m. a◦b denotes the Hadamard product of a and b. aD is a
diagonal matrix with the elements of vector a on the diagonal.
B. Computing Prior Probability of an Event
To avoid the exponential complexity, we propose an efficient
algorithm with two possible worlds. The idea is to elaborate a
“new” transition matrix Mt ∈ R2m×2m at each time t which
encodes the complex spatiotemporal event inside, so that the
calculation of the prior or joint probability for a complicated
event is the same as one simple predicate.
Intuition. The main idea of our method is to use two virtual
worlds denoting whether the EVENT is true or false. The
states in the two worlds denote the joint probabilities Pr(ut =
si, EVENT) and Pr(ut = si,¬EVENT). For PRESENCE, once
a trajectory enters into the region of the PRESENCE, its
probability will be kept in the world of true EVENT forever.
For PATTERN, the probability distribution among the two
worlds are derived at the beginning timestamp of the EVENT,
and only the trajectories satisfying the PATTERN will be kept
in the world of true EVENT. At last, the sum of probabilities
in the world of true EVENT will be Pr(EVENT is true).
PRESENCE. We first study the PRESENCE event. Let us
consider the following example.
Example III.1. Let S = {s1, s2, s3}. A PRESENCE event is
defined in s1 and s2 during t = 3 and t = 4, i.e., s = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ,
start = 3, end = 4. The transition matrix M is given below.
M =
 0.1 0.2 0.70.4 0.1 0.5
0 0.1 0.9
 (2)
Then Fig.4 shows the new transitions in the two worlds, the
top world and the bottom world separated by the dashed line
in Fig.4. From time 1 to 2, a normal transition can be made.
At timestamp 2, all the transitions going to the states s1 and
s2 will be re-directed to the new states s′1 and s
′
2, denoting the
states when the PRESENCE happens. Other transitions that do
not go the the area will perform normally. Similarly at time
3, the transition from s3 to s2 will also go to the state s′2
because the event is also true in this case. After time 4, the
original Markov transitions come back to work again.
s1
s2
s3
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Presence
s
0
1
s
0
2
s
0
3
Presence
is true
Presence
is false
Fig. 4: New Markov transitions: all transitions going to the PRES-
ENCE area will be re-directed to the virtual worlds.
The intuition can be formalized as follows. First, the original
probabilities in R1×m is extended to R1×2m. Thus the initial
probability pi becomes [pi, 0]. Second, the transition matrix Mt
becomes the form of four transition matrices between the two
virtual worlds, i.e. the EVENT is true or false, in Equation (3).
Then the new transition matrices can be derived in Equations
(4) and (5) where M is the original transition matrix and S is
the region of PRESENCE defined in Definition II.2.
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Mt =
[
false→ false false→ true
true→ false true→ true
]
on the event. (3)
Mt =
[
M−MsD MsD
0D M
]
, start− 1 ≤ t ≤ end− 1. (4)
Mt =
[
M 0D
0D M
]
, t < start− 1 or t ≥ end. (5)
Equation (4), designed to capture and maintain all the
transitions going to the region of the PRESENCE, is the new
transition matrix when entering (and inside) the event time.
Equation (5), designed to keep the original transitions in
the two virtual worlds, is the new transition matrix when
leaving (and before) the event time. Third, at the last time
T , the probability of the PRESENCE will be the sum of all
probabilities in the bottom world (where PRESENCE is true).
PATTERN. For PATTERN events, the bottom world denoting
the event is true only needs to preserve the transitions going
to the defined areas of the PATTERN event. The following
example shows the mechanism.
Example III.2. We study the PATTERN event in Fig.5. At time
1, the transitions entering s1 and s2 go to s′1 and s
′
2. From time
2 to 4, the transitions in the above world perform normally.
But the transitions from the bottom world go back to the top
world if the destinations are not in the defined regions. At time
5, the original Markov transitions come back to world again.
s1
s2
s3
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Pattern
s
0
1
s
0
2
s
0
3
Pattern
is true
Pattern
is false
Fig. 5: New Markov transitions: at timestamp 1, all transitions
going to the defined area will be re-directed to the bottom world;
at timestamp 2 ∼ 4, only the transitions from the bottom world to
the defined areas remain below.
From above example, the transition matrix for PATTERN
only differs from that for PRESENCE during the event time,
shown in Equation (7) where st is the regions defined in
Definition II.3. The transitions outside the event time, i.e.
t < start or t ≥ end, will be the same as Equations (4) and
(5).
Mt =
[
M−MsD MsD
0D M
]
, t = start− 1. (6)
Mt =
[
M 0D
M−MsDt MsDt
]
, start ≤ t ≤ end− 1. (7)
Mt =
[
M 0D
0D M
]
, t < start− 1 or t ≥ end. (8)
In summary, the prior probability of any EVENT can be
derived as the sum of probabilities in the world where the
EVENT is true. Lemma III.1 shows the formal computation.
Lemma III.1. For initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, the prior
probability of an EVENT of PRESENCE and PATTERN is
Pr(EVENT) = [pi, 0]
end−1∏
i=1
Mi[0, 1]ᵀ (9)
where Mi is computed by Equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8).
When the transition matrices M at different t are not
identical, the only extra effort is to re-compute Equations
(4)∼(8) using the corresponding transition matrix M at t.
C. Computing Joint Probability of an Event
The calculation of a spatiotemporal event and a set of
observed locations, i.e, Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT , EVENT) is a little
more complicated than previous sections since it dependents
on not only the initial probabilities but also the emission
matrix of the LPPM. Similarly, we use two-possible-world
method to avoid enumerating all possible cases of an event.
We utilize forward-backward algorithm [15] to estimate the
probability of the true state (true location) at timestamp t
given all observations Pr(ut|o1, o2, · · · , oT ). It first calculates
a forward probability αkt = Pr(u
t = sk, o1, o2, · · · , ot)
iteratively, i.e.,
αkt = Pr(ot|ut = sk)
∑
i
αit−1Pr(u
t = sk|ut−1 = si). (10)
Then, a backward probability βkt = Pr(ot+1, ot+2, · · · , oT |ut =
sk) can also be derived by
βkt =
∑
i
Pr(ut+1 = si|ut = sk)Pr(ot+1|ut+1 = si)βit+1. (11)
By initializing βkT = 1 for all k, we can obtain the
estimation of ut as follows.
Pr(ut = sk|o1, o2, · · · , oT ) = α
k
t β
k
t∑
i α
i
tβ
i
t
(12)
Intuition. The intuition of our solution is to use the forward-
backward algorithm in the two virtual worlds where the
EVENT is true and false. This is feasible because the
emission probability, which determines the probabilities of
the observations, is independent from any EVENTS. Hence
in our computation the forward probability and backward
probability are Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) for t ≤ end and
Pr(oend+1, oend+2, · · · , ot|EVENT) for t > end respectively.
By combining them together, we can obtain the posterior
probability of the EVENT. Note that at any timestamp t ≤ end,
we do not see the future (t > end) observations. Thus the
posterior probability only counts to the current timestamp t.
Before and During the Event. In the forward algorithm,
the probability αkt = Pr(u
t = sk, o1, o2, · · · , ot) is de-
rived at timestamp t. We represent αkt in the vector form
αt = [α
1
1, α
2
t , · · · , αmt ]. Then it can be derived as αt =
(αt−1Mt−1) ◦ p˜ot = αt−1Mt−1p˜Dot . Without any further
observations, the joint probability can be derived from Lemma
III.1. The result is shown in Lemma III.2.
Lemma III.2. Given initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, the joint
probability of an EVENT of PRESENCE or PATTERN and
observations o1, o2, · · · , ot at any timestamp t ≤ end is
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Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = [pi, 0]
p˜Do1 t∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
end−1∏
i=t
Mi[0, 1]
ᵀ

(13)
After the Event. In the backward algorithm, βkt =
Pr(ot+1, ot+2, · · · , oT |ut = sk). We represent it in the vector
form βt = [β1t , β2t , · · · , βmt ]. Then it can be derived as βt =
(βt+1 ◦ p˜ot+1 )M
ᵀ
t = βt+1p˜
D
ot+1
Mᵀt for any t > end. Similarly,
the joint probability can be obtained by Lemma III.3.
Lemma III.3. Given initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, the joint
probability of an EVENT of PRESENCE or PATTERN and
observations o1, o2, · · · , ot at any timestamp t > end is
Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = [pi, 0](
p˜Do1
end∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
)[1, 1] end∏
i=t−1
(p˜Doi+1M
ᵀ
i ) ◦ [0, 1]
ᵀ (14)
To summarize, now we can quantify the ratio
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT) = Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)Pr(EVENT) for
spatiotemporal event privacy using Lemma III.1 to
compute Pr(EVENT) and Lemmas III.2, III.3 to compute
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT , EVENT). We note that our approach of
computing the joint probability of an event is able to deal
with different emission matrices at each t. Since p˜ot is a
vector of emission probabilities given the observation ot, i.e,
a column in the emission matrix, and p˜Dot is a diagonal matrix
whose diagonal elements are p˜ot , we only need to obtain p˜ot
and p˜Dot from the corresponding emission matrix at t, and
then use such p˜Dot in Equations (13) and (14).
IV. PRISTE FRAMEWORK
In previous section, we designed methods for quantifying
-spatiotemporal event privacy w.r.t. a specified initial proba-
bility, which means that the quantification may not be true if
attacker has a different initial probability since different initial
probabilities may result in very different prior and joint proba-
bilities. In this section, we first solve this problem to ensure -
spatiotemporal event privacy for any initial probabilities, then
design a framework that converts planar Laplace mechanism
into one protecting spatiotemporal event privacy.
A. Tackling Arbitrary Initial Probability
According to the quantification in Section III, we can
calculate Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) given o1, o2, · · · , oT and a given
initial probability pi. In the next section, we will propose
a framework that ensures any output from the framework
satisfies -spatiotemporal event privacy. In this section, we
show how to make sure the ratio is bounded given arbitrary
initial probability. Our idea to is taking pi as a variable and
solving the maximization problem of Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT)−e
.
We want to make sure the maximum value is always less than
or equal to 0, i.e., the user enjoys plausible deniability for her
specified spatiotemporal event.
The following theorem shows the conditions related to pi
that satisfies -spatiotemporal event privacy. We will formulate
it as an optimization problem.
Theorem IV.1. For an EVENT of PRESENCE or PAT-
TERN and an arbitrary initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, -
spatiotemporal event privacy is satisfied at any timestamp t,
i.e., Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) ≤ e
, if the observation ot is released
based on the following two conditions
pi
(
[1D, 0D]
(
(e
 − 1)aᵀb− eaᵀc) [1D, 0D]ᵀ)piᵀ + pi[1D, 0D](bᵀ) ≤ 0 (15)
pi
(
[1D, 0D]
(
(e
 − 1)aᵀb + aᵀc) [1D, 0D]ᵀ)piᵀ − pi[1D, 0D](ebᵀ) ≤ 0 (16)
where
aᵀ =
end−1∏
i=1
Mi[0, 1]ᵀ (17)
For t ≤ end,
bᵀ = p˜Do1
t∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )
end−1∏
i=t
Mi[0, 1]ᵀcᵀ = p˜Do1
t∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )[1, 1]
ᵀ
(18)
For t > end,
bᵀ = p˜Do1
end∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )
[1, 1] end∏
i=t−1
(p˜Doi+1M
ᵀ
i ) ◦ [0, 1]
ᵀ (19)
cᵀ = p˜Do1
end∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )
[1, 1] end∏
i=t−1
(p˜Doi+1M
ᵀ
i ) ◦ [1, 1]
ᵀ (20)
Quadratic Programming. To determine whether Equations
(15) and (16) are true or not for arbitrary pi, we transform them
to maximization problems: finding the maximum values of the
left parts of Equations (15) and (16) under the constraints of
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 where pi ∈ pi. As long as one of maximum
values is larger than 0, then we know that the LPPM (emission
matrix) may not satisfy -spatiotemporal event privacy. The
maximization are equivalent to quadratic programing problem
since they can be rewritten in a form of piApiᵀ = 1
2
pi(A+Aᵀ)piᵀ
where A is a matrix. We skip the computation details about
solving such quadratic programing problem since many meth-
ods and tools have been proposed in literature. In experiments,
we use IBM CPLEX optimizer as our computation engine.
B. PriSTE
Based on the quantification techniques that we developed
in previous sections, we propose a framework that converts
a location privacy protection mechanism into one protecting
spatiotemporal event privacy. The PriSTE framework is illus-
trated in Fig.6 and described in Algorithm 1.
time
Private:
(local)
Public:
LPPM
Quantification
True
Loc. Event
perturbed 
loc.
LPPM
Quantification
True
Loc. Event
perturbed 
loc.
LPPM
Quantification
True
Loc. Event
perturbed 
loc.
  
Fig. 6: PriSTE framework.
The major components are Quantification and a given
LPPM. Their interactions are described as follows. First, the
LPPM generates a perturbed location from the true location
and pass it to the Quantification component. By Theorem IV.1,
the Quantification component check whether this perturbed
location satisfies the ratio in Equation (1) (-spatiotemporal
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event privacy) or not, under a sequence of previous obser-
vations and user-specified spatiotemporal events. If not, we
need to calibrate the emission matrix to ensure that it satis-
fies -spatiotemporal event privacy. The strategy of emission
matrix calibration is LPPM-dependent. In the next section, we
demonstrate a case study for Planar Laplace Mechanism [8],
which is the state-of-the-art mechanism for location privacy.
Algorithm 1 PriSTE Framework
Require: true location, , LPPM, M, EVENTS
1: for t in {1, 2, · · · , T} do
2: generate ot with LPPM w.r.t. the true location;
3: while -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy not hold do
4: calibrate LPPM and generate ot;
5: end while
6: release ot;
7: end for
C. Case Study 1: PriSTE with Geo-indistinguishability.
In this section, we instantiate PriSTE framework using α-
Planar Laplace mechanism (α-PLM) which is designed for
Geo-indistinguishability [8]. We first show the computation
details for quantifying -spatiotemporal event privacy by The-
orem IV.1, and then design a greedy strategy for approximately
achieving -spatiotemporal event privacy.
Algorithm Design. To implement the quantification com-
ponent, we need to (1) compute the internal parameters a, b
and c shown in Theorem IV.1, and (2) design a strategy to
calibrate the emission matrix.
As for the calibration strategy for Planar Laplace Mecha-
nism (PLM) with a specified privacy budget α (which solely
determine the shape of the output distribution), we exponen-
tially decay its privacy budget because the smaller privacy
budget implies stronger protection for location privacy and less
information disclosure. In our algorithm, decay rate 12 for the
privacy budget in line 10 of Algorithm 2 is a tunable parameter
that provides a trade-off between efficiency and utility of the
released locations. Setting a small value allows the algorithm
converge faster, but at the cost of over-perturbing the location
at each timestamp. In contrast, using a large value is less
efficient but allows better utility to be achieved.
A natural question is that can we always find an α to release
a perturbed location that satisfies Equation (1). The answer
is yes because α converges exponentially to 0. When α =
0, it releases no useful information about the true location,
i.e., uniformly returning a location without using user’s true
position. It is easy to verify that the Equations (15) and (16)
are always true in this situation.
Algorithm 2 shows the computation process. To boost the
efficiency of our algorithm, we use intermediate matrices A
and B to facilitate the computation of b and c. At time 1, we
initialize the variables as line 4 ∼ 8. At any time before and
inside the EVENT, we compute the variables as line 10 ∼ 11.
At any timestamps after the EVENT, the variables are derived
as line 13 ∼ 14. Then we use quadratic programming methods
to check Eq.(15) and (16) to decide whether to release the ot or
not. If not, we generate a new ot with only half α, and repeat
the above process again. Finally, we update the matrices A and
B as line 21 ∼ 25. If t = end, in line 10, the product ∏end−1i=t Mi
will be the identity matrix. In line 22, M0 is the identity matrix
when t = 1. We note that for multiple EVENTS, Algorithm 2
can be executed multiple times for each EVENT.
Algorithm 2 PriSTE with Geo-indistinguishability.
Require: , EVENT, α-PLM, Mi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}
1: for t in {1, 2, · · · , T} do
2: ot ← α-PLM; . initial budget= α
3: if t == 1 then
4: aᵀ ←∏end−1i=1 Mi[0, 1]ᵀ
5: A← I . identity matrix
6: B← I
7: bᵀ ← p˜Do1aᵀ
8: cᵀ ← p˜ᵀo1
9: else if t <= end then . before and during EVENT
10: bᵀ ← AMt−1p˜Dot
∏end−1
i=t Mi[0, 1]
ᵀ
11: cᵀ ← AMt−1p˜Dot [1, 1]ᵀ
12: else . after EVENT
13: bᵀ ← A
(
([1, 1]p˜DotM
ᵀ
t−1B) ◦ [0, 1]
)ᵀ
14: cᵀ ← A
(
([1, 1]p˜DotM
ᵀ
t−1B) ◦ [1, 1]
)ᵀ
15: end if
16: if Equations (15) and (16) hold then .  is used here.
17: release ot; . okay to release ot
18: else
19: α← α
2
, goto Line 2; . halve the budget
20: end if
21: if t ≤ end then
22: A← AMt−1p˜Dot . update A by the real ot
23: else
24: B← p˜DotM
ᵀ
t−1B . update B by the real ot
25: end if
26: end for
Complexity. The internal parameters a, b and c in Algorithm
2 need O(mT ) time to be evaluated. The major computational
cost lies in the quadratic program for checking Equations
(15) and (16). The complexity will be determined by the
quadratic matrix [1D, 0D]aᵀc[1D, 0D]ᵀ. If it is positive definite,
then the complexity is O(m3). Otherwise, with any negative
eigenvalues, it will be NP-hard [16]. In our experiments, we
use IBM CPLEX which can provide globally optimal results
for quadratic program but may need a long computation time.
We use a conservative release strategy to remedy this: we
use a threshold to limit the computation time of quadratic
program for checking Eq.(15) and Eq.(16). It will not release
a perturbed location unless we are sure that the equations
are true. Although it may lead to suboptimal solution in
budget calibration, it always guarantees -spatiotemporal event
privacy since every released locations satisfy Eq.(15) and (16).
Privacy Analysis. PriSTE framework relies on a local model,
i.e., the assumption that adversaries cannot obtain user’s
locally stored information as shown in Fig.6. Although line 2
may be executed more than once at a time point t, Algorithm
2 still satisfies α′-geo-indistinguishability where α′ is the final
privacy budget used for releasing ot because that is the only
observation of attacker at time t. If we remove the assumption
of local model, the above statements may not be true since
attacker may observe the internal states of the algorithm
(which is the privacy goal of pan-privacy [17]). Examples of
internal states includes multiple ot tested at t or the final α′
used in the algorithm. Anothe assumption that may affect the
privacy guarantee is the transition matrix M, which we use it
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to model the correlations between locations and assume that it
is given. It is an interesting future work to quantify the change
of privacy loss in terms of -spatiotemporal event privacy if
the ground truth of correlation is not the modeled one. We
defer this study to future work.
D. Case Study 2: PriSTE with δ-Location Set Privacy.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of PriSTE framework,
we also instantiate it using another privacy metric δ-location
set privacy [9] [18], which is proposed for obtaining better
utility by taking advantage of temporal correlation between
consecutive locations in user’s trajectory. The key idea is
that hiding the true location in any impossible locations (e.g.,
whose probabilities are close to 0) is a lost cause because the
adversary already knows the user cannot be there. In other
words, it restricts the output domain of the emission matrix to
δ-location set, which is a set containing minimum number of
locations that have prior probability sum no less than 1 − δ.
A larger δ indicates weaker privacy guarantee.
The privacy metrics of α-geo-indistinguishability and δ-
location set privacy are orthogonal because the former requires
a specific “shape” of emission distribution and the latter
restricts output domain of the emission distribution. In [9],
Xiao and Xiong proposed a framework to achieve δ-location
set privacy using a given LPPM. For ease of comparison, we
use α-LPM as the underlying LPPM for δ-location set privacy.
Algorithm 3 PriSTE with δ-Location Set Privacy.
Require: , EVENT, α-PLM, Mi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}, pi, δ, M.
1: for t in {1, 2, · · · , T} do
2: p−t ← p+t−1M; . Markov transition
3: Construct ∆Xt . δ-location set
4: ot ← α-PLM within ∆Xt;
5: the same as Lines 3 ∼ 15 in Algorithm 2;
6: if Equations (15) and (16) hold then .  is used here.
7: release ot; . okay to release ot
8: Derive posterior probability p+t by Eq.(21);
9: else
10: α← α2 , goto Line 4; . halve the budget
11: end if
12: the same as Lines 21 ∼ 25 in Algorithm 2;
13: end for
In Line 2, when t = 1, we have p+0 = pi. In Line 8,
according to [9], the posterior probability can be calculated
by Equation (21) where p+t [j] and p−t [i] are the ith elements
in the corresponding probability vectors.
p
+
t [i] = Pr(u
t
= si|ot) =
Pr(ot|ut = si) ∗ p−t [i]∑
j Pr(ot|ut = sj) ∗ p−t [j]
(21)
The calculation of δ-location set requires the initial proba-
bility pi. In experiments, we set pi to a uniform distribution.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In experiments, we verified that Algorithms 2 and 3 can
adaptively calibrate the privacy budget of Planar Laplace
Mechanism (PLM) at each timestamp for -spatiotemporal
event privacy. We highlight the following empirical findings.
• A stricter LPPM can satisfy a certain level of spatiotem-
poral event privacy without any change, whereas a more
loose LPPM may need to reduce its privacy budget
significantly for protecting the same event.
• For achieving a specific -spatiotemporal event privacy, a
stricter LPPM is not always better in terms of data utility.
• If the user’s transition matrix has a significant pattern,
an LPPM may need a small privacy budge to achieve
-spatiotemporal event privacy.
A. Experiment Settings and Metrics
Dataset. We used real-life and synthetic datasets in exper-
iments. Geolife data [19] was collected from 182 users in
a period of over three years. It recorded a wide range of
users’ outdoor movements, represented by a series of tuples
containing latitude, longitude and timestamp. The user’s entire
trajectory is used to train the transition matrix M, e.g. with R
package “markovchain”.
We generated a synthetic trajectory and its transition proba-
bility matrix as follows. First, a map with 20∗20 cells is gener-
ated. Then, the transition probability from one cell to another
is proportional to the two-dimensional Gaussian distribution
with scale parameter σ. Here, a smaller σ indicates that the
user moves to the adjacent cells in a higher probability, i.e.,
the transition matrix has a more significant pattern. Finally, we
produced trajectories with 50 timestamps using such transition
matrix to simulate movement of a user.
Quadratic Programming. We use the IBM CPLEX opti-
mizer4 to find the globally optimal solution for the quadratic
programming in Algorithm 2. We adopt a strategy of conserva-
tive release as mentioned previously and limit the computation
time for each optimization to 1 seconds.
EVENTS. We investigate PRESENCE and PATTERN events,
which are represented by two parameters S and T. For
example, PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) is PRESENCE
event denoting the user appears in the region of {s1, s2, · · · , s10}
during timestamps {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
Utility Metrics. We use two metrics to evaluate data utility.
• Privacy budget α used in PLM, including α at each
timestamp (see Section V-B) and the average α during the
whole time period (see Section V-C). The higher privacy
budget indicates the higher utility.
• The Euclidean distance between the perturbed locations
and the true locations. The smaller Euclidean distance
indicates the higher utility.
We run our algorithm 100 times and aggregate the results to
calculate average privacy budget and Euclidean distance.
B. Utility at Each Timestamp
In this section, we show the utility (average privacy budget
over 100 runs) at each timestamp for protecting PRESENCE(S =
{1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) and PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {16 : 20}).
PriSTE with Geo-indistinguishability. In Fig.7(a), it turns
out that, 0.2-PLM satisfies 1-spatiotemporal event privacy
with only slight privacy budget reduction, and satisfies 0.5-
spatiotemporal event privacy with few budget reduction, but
4https://www.ibm.com/analytics/data-science/prescriptive-analytics/cplex-
optimizer
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need to reduce more privacy budgets (to be stricter) in order to
achieve 0.1-spatiotemporal event privacy. Similar results can
be observed in Fig.7(b) and Fig.8. We also observe that the
standard deviation is larger for weaker LPPMs since these
privacy budgets need to be frequently calibrated. Hence, we
can conclude that a stricter PLM for location privacy can
protect spatiotemporal event without much calibration, but
a more loose PLM may need to reduce its privacy budget
significantly for -spatiotemporal event privacy.
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Fig. 7: PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) on synthetic data.
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Fig. 8: PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {16 : 20}) on synthetic data.
Comparing Fig.7 with Fig.8, where the events are defined
on time periods 4∼8 and 16∼20 respectively, we can see that
privacy budgets trend to be reduced during the defined time
periods. This indicates that the final α used by PLM at each
time point may disclose the definition of spatiotemporal event
as we discussion in Section IV-B. Hence, a local model is
needed for PriSTE framework.
Protecting multiple events. Fig.9 depicts the utilities when
protecting two events sequentially using Algorithm 2. We can
see that the utility is much worse than protecting each single
event in Fig.7 or Fig.8 because the algorithm needs to simulta-
neously check if -spatiotemporal event privacy is satisfied for
both events at each time. If no perturbed location satisfying
the privacy requirement of both events simultaneously, the
algorithm needs to halve the privacy budget until finding an
appropriate output.
PriSTE with δ-Location Set Privacy. In Fig.10, we show
the utility of PriSTE with LPPMs that satisfy δ-Location
Set Privacy (Algorithm 3). Comparing Fig.10 with Fig.7,
although both of them are using 0.2-PLM, the essential
difference between them is the privacy metric: the former
satisfies δ-location set privacy and the latter satisfies geo-
indistinguishability, i.e., 0.2-PLM in Fig.10 has a constrained
output domain. We can see that such 0.2-PLM in Fig.10 has
to reduce more privacy budgets to achieve -spatiotemporal
event privacy. Intuitively, it is because the privacy metric of
δ-location set privacy implies a weaker privacy guarantee due
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Fig. 9: Protecting two events PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) and
PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {16 : 20}) on synthetic data.
to the temporal correlations and its LPPM has to be stricter
(using a smaller privacy budget) for protecting the event.
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(a) 0.2-PLM with δ-location set pri-
vacy for different .
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Fig. 10: PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) on synthetic data.
C. Utility over Timestamps
In this section, we demonstrate the utility against different
factors on the Geolife data and synthetic data. Figures 11 and
12 are for protecting PRESENCE event. Due to space limitation,
the results of protecting PATTERN event are included in Ap-
pendices. Different from the utility in previous section which
is averaged at each time, this section displays the utility that
is further averaged over time points. Hence, in the left parts of
Figures 11 and 12 (ave. budget), the steeper lines indicate the
budget may be reduced heavily at some timestamps. Generally,
the utility increases with a larger  in Fig.11 and Fig.12.
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Fig. 11: PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) on Geolife data.
Utility vs. α-geo-indistinguishability. In Fig.11, we can
see that a larger α-PLM needs to be calibrated heavily (i.e.,
steeper) for a small . Interestingly, PLMs who have larger
average budgets (in the left figures) may not necessarily have
better utility in terms of Euclidean distance. For example, we
can see that, at  = 0.5, the Euclidean distance of 5-PLM
and 3-PLM are very close; at  = 1 or 2, 0.5-PLM and
1-PLM appear to have almost the same Euclidean distance.
The reason is that PLMs who have larger average budgets
may have extremely small budgets at some timestamps, which
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results in the higher average Euclidean distance averaged over
time points.
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Fig. 12: PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) on Geolife data (0.5-LPM
with δ-location set privacy).
Utility vs. δ-location set privacy. In Fig.12, we can see
that a PLM with a larger δ tends to have a smaller average
budget. It is because the PLM with a larger δ indicates a
weaker privacy metric. Hence, the PLM needs to be stricter
(i.e, a small budget) to achieve spatiotemporal event privacy.
However, such PLM may have a better utility in terms of
Euclidean distance as shown in right figure of Fig.12. The
reason is that δ-location set privacy with a larger δ restricts the
output domain significantly, which makes perturbed location
close to the true location in a high probability. The results are
in line with the main purpose of δ-location set privacy: to have
a better trade off between utility and privacy.
Utility vs. Transition Matrices. We compare the utility
against transition matrices that have different strength of
mobility patterns. As we explained previously, a smaller σ
indicates a more significant mobility pattern. Fig.13 shows
that, for the same LPPM, it is hard to protect a spatiotemporal
event if user’s mobility pattern is significant, i.e., the LPPM
needs to be very strict by using a small privacy budget. We also
observe that there is no best LPPM for all -spatiotemporal
event privacy in terms of Euclidean distance.
0.1 0.5 1 2
-ST-Event Privacy
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PL
M
 b
ud
ge
t
ave. budgets of PLMs vs. 
 = 0.01
 = 0.1
 = 1
 = 10
0.1 0.5 1 2
-ST-Event Privacy
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
a
ve
. 
Eu
cl
id
 d
ist
. (k
m)
ave. Euclid dist. of PLMs vs. 
 = 0.01
 = 0.1
 = 1
 = 10
Fig. 13: PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10},T = {4 : 8}) on synthetic data (1-LPM
with geo-indistinguishability).
D. Runtime
We name the size of T and the size of S as event length
and event width, respectively. We also report the performance
evaluation on conservative release described in Section IV-B.
Runtime vs. Event Length. We fix the event width as 5
and test 100 random events with length ranging from 5 to
15. Fig.14 shows that the average runtime of the baseline is
exponential to event length and the runtime of our method is
linear to the event length.
Runtime vs. Event Width. We fix the event length as 5 and
test 100 random events with width ranging from 5 to 15. Fig.14
shows that the average runtime of the baseline is exponential
to event width, while our method is polynomial to the event
width, which is in line with the complexity of O(m3).
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Fig. 14: Runtime
Runtime vs. Conservative Release. In Line 16 of Algorithm
2, we set a threshold runtime in solving the quadratic program.
We do not release the perturbed location unless we are sure
that Eq.(15) and Eq.(16) are true. The threshold is a trade-off
between runtime and utility as shown in Table III among 100
runs. We note that each runtime in Table III includes the whole
process of Algorithm 2. In our implementation, we set the
threshold to 1 second. We can see as the threshold increases,
the number of conservative releases decreases, which results in
increasing runtime. On the other hand, the calibrated privacy
budgets increasse as the threshold increases. This verifies the
tradeoff between runtime and utility that can be achieved by
the conservative release.
threshold
(s)
ave. total
runtime (s)
# of Con-
servative
Release
ave.
privacy
budget
ave.
Euclidean
dist. (km)
0.01 1.1 33 0.16 2.22
0.1 2.6 30 0.23 1.51
1 5.9 21 0.22 1.52
2 10.4 12 0.29 0.93
5 19.5 8 0.27 1.41
none 52.5 0 0.31 0.97
TABLE III: Runtime vs. threshold
VI. RELATED WORKS
A. Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
The LPPMs [8] [9] [20] [21] [22] generally use some
obfuscation methods, like spatial cloaking, cell merging, lo-
cation precision reduction or dummy cells, to manipulate
the probability distribution of users’ locations. As differential
privacy becomes a standard for privacy protection, [8] pro-
posed a Geo-indistinguishability notion based on differential
privacy and a planar Laplace mechanism to achieve it. Xiao
et al. [9] [18] studied how to protect location privacy under
temporal correlations with an optimal differentially private
mechanism. Rodriguez-Carrion et al. [23] also studied the
effect of temporal dependencies on entropy-based location
privacy metric. They proposed a new privacy metric entropy
rate and perturbative mechanisms based on it, which can be an
alternative LPPM in our framework for protecting spatiotem-
poral event privacy. Several studies [24] [25] [26] tried to
achieve an optimal trade-off between the utility of applications
and the privacy guarantee in the LPPMs. Overall, above works
all focused on the mechanisms of location privacy, which can
be used in our framework as given LPPMs. Whereas we study
a new problem of spatiotemporal event privacy.
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B. Inferences on Location
Various inference attacks can be carried out based on
location information and external information such as moving
patterns. In the aggregated setting, recent works have studied
location or trajectory recovery attacks from aggregated loca-
tion data [7] [27] or proximity query results from location
data [3]. We mainly discuss the individual setting that is
closely related to our work. Studies [24] [28] investigated
the question of how to formally quantify the privacy of
existing LPPMs, given an adversary who can model users’
mobility using a Markov process learned from population.
[29] used a hierarchical Markov model to learn and infer a
user’s trajectory based on the places and temporal patterns they
visited. [30] used the Continuous Time Bayesian Networks to
predict uncertain trajectories of moving objects. Li et al. [31]
uses frequent mining approach to find moving objects that
move within arbitrary shape of clusters for certain timestamps
that are possibly nonconsecutive.
Our privacy check algorithms for computing the prior
and posterior probabilities of a spatiotemporal event given
perturbed locations are inspired by the work in [32]. Given
a Markov process and uncertain locations of moving objects,
[32] proposed a modified matrix computation method to effi-
ciently compute the probability of a user appearing in certain
region during certain time period. However, the technique
in [32] can be only used to compute the probability of the
presence of a user in a region during a time period which we
refer to as PRESENCE event, whereas we extend the technique
to a general set of spatiotemporal events.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigate a new type of pivacy goal:
protecting spatiotemporal event, which has not been studied in
literature. We formally define spatiotemporal events and design
a privacy metric extending the notion of differential privacy.
We proposed PriSTE, a framework integrating an LPPM for
protecting the spatiotemporal event privacy. An interesting
direction is to find optimal way for achieving both location
privacy and spatiotemporal event privacy. Another question is
how can we design a generic mechanism for spatiotemporal
event privacy without relying on an LPPM.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma III.2
Proof. At timestamps 1, α1 = [pi, 0] ◦ p˜o1 . For t > 1, αt =
α1M1p˜Do2 · · ·Mt−1p˜Dot = [pi, 0]
(
p˜Do1
∏t
i=2(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
)
. By Lemma
III.1, Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = αt
∏end−1
i=t Mi[0, 1]
ᵀ. Then Equa-
tion (13) can be derived.
B. Proof of Lemma III.3
Proof. Pr(o1, o2, · · · , ot, EVENT is true) = ∑k Pr (uend =
k, o1, o2, · · · , ot, EVENT is true
)
. By forward-backward algo-
rithm, Pr(ut = sk, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = αkt βkt . Thus we only
need to derive the αend and βend and compute the sum of
αend ◦βend in the world where the EVENT is true. By Lemma
III.2, αend = [pi, 0]
(
p˜Do1
∏end
i=2(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
)
. By backward algo-
rithm, βend = [1, 1]
∏end
i=t−1(p˜
D
oi+1
Mᵀi ) with βt = [1, 1]. Thus
Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = (αend ◦ βend)[0, 1]ᵀ = αend(βend ◦
[0, 1])ᵀ, which is equal to Equation (14).
C. Proof of Theorem IV.1
Proof Sketch. By Definition II.4, it is equivalent to prove
f1(pi) ≤ 0 and f2(pi) ≤ 0 where f1(pi) = Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)Pr(EVENT) −
e Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,¬EVENT)
Pr(¬EVENT) and f2(pi) =
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,¬EVENT)
Pr(¬EVENT) −
e Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)
Pr(EVENT) . By Lemma III.1 and III.3, Theorem IV.1
can be derived.
APPENDIX B
NAIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Computing Prior Probability of an Event
Considering an event is a set of Boolean expression of
(location, time) predicates combined with AND and OR, a
naive approach would be to enumerate all possible cases for
the event and sum (correspond to OR) the product (correspond
to AND) of the probabilities of each location predicate and
such an approach would require exponential computation time.
Due to space limitation, we omit a detailed algorithm for this
naive solution. Instead, we show an example as below.
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Pattern
s1
s2
s3
Fig. 15: Pr(PATTERN) = ∑Pr(all trajectories rendering PATTERN) for
the 24 trajectories satisfying the PATTERN event defined above.
Example B.1. In Fig.15, a PATTERN event is defined by the
shaded regions during timestamp 2 to 5. Thus start = 2,
end = 5. The regions are s2 = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ, s3 = [0, 1, 1]ᵀ,
s4 = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ, s5 = [0, 1, 1]ᵀ. To derive the probability of
one trajectory, e.g. the solid lines in Fig.15, it would be
Pr(u2 = s1) ∗ Pr(u3 = s2|u2 = s1) ∗ Pr(u4 = s1|u3 =
s2, u
2 = s1) ∗ Pr(u5 = s1|u4 = s1, u3 = s2, u2 = s1). Because
there are 24 trajectories for the PATTERN event, the prior
probability of PATTERN, i.e., Pr(PATTERN) is the sum of 24
such probabilities.
B. Computing Join Probability of an Event
Algorithm 4 Naive Algorithm to Derive the Joint Probability
of a PATTERN
Require: M, pstart−1: the probability at timestamp start − 1, p˜ot , PATTERN in
timestamp start, · · · , end
ppattern ← 0
for traj in PATTERN do . exponential trajectories
ptraj ← (pstart−1M) ◦ p˜ot
ptraj = ptraj [ustart in traj]
for t in {start+ 1, · · · , end} do
st−1 ← ut−1 in traj
st ← ut in traj
ptraj ← ptraj ∗mst−1st ∗ p˜ot [st]
end for
ppattern ← ppattern + ptraj
end for
Let traj be a trajectory of the PATTERN. There will
be |traj| trajectories of the PATTERN. For example, in
Figure 15, the solid line is traj = {u2 = s1, u3 =
s2, u
4 = s1, u
5 = s2}, which means u2 in traj is s1,
· · · , u5 in traj is s2. Let M be the transition matrix
where mij is the transition probability from state i to state
j. p˜ot denotes the emission probability of observing ot,
p˜ot = [Pr(ot|ut = s1),Pr(ot|ut = s2), · · · ,Pr(ot|ut =
sm)]. Thus p˜ot [s1] = Pr(ot|ut = s1), · · · , p˜ot [sm] =
Pr(ot|ut = sm). Let Pr(ostart, · · · , oend, traj) be the joint
probability of the observations and the trajectory. Then
Pr(traj|ostart, · · · , oend) = Pr(ostart,··· ,oend,traj)Pr(ostart,··· ,oend) . Thus we
focus on the joint probability Pr(ostart, · · · , oend, traj).
Setup. Let start = 2, pstart−1 = pi. For a given pi, Algorithm
4 can be used to derive the joint probability of a PATTERN.
The runtime can be compared with the runtime of Equation
(13), which is also the joint probability.
Note that to derive Equation (13), we prefer “vector*matrix”
instead of “matrix*matrix” for efficiency. Calculate it from left
to right so that no matrix multiplication should be conducted.
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES
A. An Example of Prior Probability Computation
We use an example to describe the details in computation.
Example C.1 (Prior Probability Computation). Let us con-
sider the computation of Example III.1. For the PRESENCE
event defined at t = 3 and t = 4, the transition matrix at
t = 2 and t = 3 derived by Equation (4) is the left matrix
below; while the transition matrix at t = 1 and t ≥ 4 derived
by Equation (5) is the right matrix below.
0 0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0
0 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0
0 0 0.9 0 0.1 0
0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
0 0 0 0.4 0.1 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.9


0.1 0.2 0.7 0 0 0
0.4 0.1 0.5 0 0 0
0 0.1 0.9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
0 0 0 0.4 0.1 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.9

(22)
M2,M3 M1,M4,M5
Thus by Lemma III.1, Pr(PRESENCE) = [pi, 0]M1M2M3[0, 1]ᵀ,
which is a function of pi as Pr(PRESENCE) = pi[0.28, 0.298, 0.226]ᵀ.
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